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Minnesota Timberwolves fans often saw the snarl from Kevin Garnett. He had a crazy look in his eyes. He’d bang his head against the stanchion, pound his chest and embody the energy of a tiger waiting to break out of its cage. The energy coursing through KG’s body could power a thousand Teslas.

He often had to find ways to calm himself down a minute or two into a playoff game because he had worked himself up too much for the big moments. And they almost always ended the same way. A mind-boggling stat line. Fingerprints all over a phenomenal game. And another loss from trying to drag an insufficient supporting cast.

When Garnett got to the Boston Celtics for the 2007-08 season, he was still an excellent player. Garnett could still score when he needed to. He was still a defensive monster all over the floor. He could still set teammates up with the best of them. KG would find ways to lead and set the tone for his new franchise. Without him, the Celtics don’t win a title with Paul Pierce in their jersey, and his career probably looks a lot more like Mitch Richmond’s. That’s still a Hall of Fame career, but you end up having to wait a lot longer when you don’t come close to winning a championship as a main guy.

What’s funny about that version of KG though, even in the 2008 championship run, is he looked nothing like the one we saw on the Minnesota Timberwolves. People didn’t pay much attention to the Wolves, even in the KG era. Sure, he’d get them on a few national games and he’d get Minnesota to the playoffs almost every year. But the Wolves were still the Wolves. They still couldn’t come through and win those big games, except for an extended run with Sam Cassell and Latrell Sprewell flanking Garnett in the 2003-04 season. Even that was ruined by imaginary testicles that Cassell couldn’t properly wield in celebration of a big shot.

The Wolves butchered the Garnett era about as spectacularly as you can. Some of it wasn’t their fault. The Collective Bargaining Agreement triggered by the 1998 lockout – triggered by the contracts given to Garnett and Shaquille O’Neal during that time – completely limited what they could pay Stephon Marbury in his second contract. He didn’t want to be paid less than Garnett was being paid, even though the new rules made his request impossible.

Tom Gugliotta, the Wolves’ other All-Star, regretfully didn’t re-sign with the Wolves in 1998. He couldn’t stand being around Marbury and he wanted to move on to a good deal with Phoenix. Minnesota would trade Marbury to New Jersey a couple months into the lockout-truncated season.

Other mistakes happened due to a historically damaging under-the-table deal with Joe Smith, injuries, bad draft picks, tough trades and a drunk driver tragically taking the life of Malik Sealy. Garnett’s contract made it difficult to navigate the salary cap world, but owner Glen Taylor was willing to spend money for a winner. The Wolves just struggled to put together a winner that could consistently help KG get to the next round.

The Wolves have a lot of Sliding Doors moments that fans think about. More recently, it’s been about drafting Steph Curry instead of Jonny Flynn. But long before Curry was close to the NBA — aside from attending his dad’s games — the Wolves were botching the career and legacy of one of the 20-25 greatest players we’ve ever seen.

Devoid of acceptable talent

If you mention that KG didn’t really have any help when he was in Minnesota, people inevitably tell you he played next to Cassell and Sprewell. That’s the team people remember the most because that’s the only team worthy of being remembered. It also wasn’t really a team that played much together. Garnett and Sprewell played 162 games together in their careers. Just two seasons. KG and Cassell played 140 games together. Just two seasons and Cassell missed a good chunk of the second season in Minnesota. That’s it. Neither player even comes close to the top 10 most games played for the Wolves during the first Garnett stint (1995-2007).

From 1995 to 2007, the Minnesota Timberwolves leaders in games played:

1. Kevin Garnett – 927 games
2. Sam Mitchell – 513 games
3. Wally Szczerbiak – 438 games
4. Anthony Peeler – 379 games
5. Trenton Hassell – 316 games
6. Rasho Nesterovic – 316 games
7. Dean Garrett – 272 games
8. Troy Hudson – 257 games
9. Joe Smith – 247 games
10. Terry Porter – 246 games

THAT is the list! Sam Mitchell was a fine role player and a key mentor for Garnett’s growth. Wally Szczerbiak became an All-Star thanks to Garnett’s play on the court and the success of the team during the 2001-02 season. He was the original Mo Williams to KG’s LeBron James. Anthony Peeler, Trenton Hassell, Rasho Nesterovic, Dean Garrett, Troy Hudson, Joe Smith and Terry Porter were all role players who had decent-to-solid value throughout their careers. Not a single acceptable running mate happened for an extended period of time during Garnett’s first 12 years in the NBA.

Garnett was a rock in terms of showing up. He played in roughly 96 percent of the games the Wolves played in those first 12 years. But not a single key teammate managed to even play three seasons worth of games next to Garnett in Minnesota. The games played numbers are staggering, but the minutes played during the KG era are also incredible. Not much changes from the games played, but we do see a new name emerge.

From 1995 to 2007, the Minnesota Timberwolves leaders in minutes played:

1. Kevin Garnett – 35,535 minutes
2. Wally Szczerbiak – 14,715 minutes
3. Sam Mitchell – 10,708 minutes
4. Anthony Peeler – 10,305 minutes
5. Trenton Hassell – 9,069 minutes
6. Tom Gugliotta – 7,548 minutes
7. Rasho Nesterovic – 7,541 minutes
8. Terrell Brandon – 7,082 minutes
9. Joe Smith – 6,432 minutes
10. Troy Hudson – 6,186 minutes

Terrell Brandon was the point guard pivot the Wolves made when Marbury wanted out of Minnesota because he’d make roughly $55 million less than Garnett during their respective six-year deals. Funny enough, this move for Brandon ended up sending Cassell to Milwaukee in a three-team deal. Brandon was an excellent player during his prime. He was a two-time All-Star in Cleveland before being moved to Milwaukee. Brandon was one of the best midrange shooters in the NBA, and the cover of Sports Illustrated called him the best point guard in the NBA in February 1997.

Unfortunately for Brandon and the Wolves, he battled knee injury after knee injury that robbed him of a good chunk of his career. He helped the Wolves build into a 50-win squad, but he only played 32 more games after turning 31 in 2001. Not just 32 more games for the Wolves; 32 more games in his career. The Wolves pivoted from a highly talented, mercurial point guard in Marbury to a highly productive, poised point guard with terrible knees in Brandon. Even though Marbury and Brandon didn’t crack the top 10 in games played with KG, they did at least take a lot of shots during their short stints.

From 1995 to 2007, the Minnesota Timberwolves leaders in shots taken:

1. Kevin Garnett – 15,414 FGA
2. Wally Szczerbiak – 5,263 FGA
3. Sam Mitchell – 3,435 FGA
4. Anthony Peeler – 3,370 FGA
5. Tom Gugliotta – 2,978 FGA
6. Terrell Brandon – 2,840 FGA
7. Stephon Marbury – 2,412 FGA
8. Troy Hudson – 2,355 FGA
9. Latrell Sprewell – 2,227 FGA
10. Rasho Nesterovic – 2,183 FGA

Brandon’s job next to KG was to keep things moving and make the defense pay for doubling against Garnett. Marbury’s job was different. He was figuring out how to be consistently dynamic with KG around the same time, so they split things a lot more evenly in their time together. Still, the Wolves went heavy with secondary and tertiary weapons like Marbury, Brandon and Gugliotta during their short stints with Garnett. Gugliotta played 200 games during his time with KG. Brandon played 202 games. Marbury only played 167 games. Much like Cassell and Sprewell, the Wolves just never kept consistent secondary talent next to Garnett.

One of the more staggering things, though, is seeing Troy Hudson in the top 10 in all four of the lists, including points scored during this 12-year span.

From 1995 to 2007, the Minnesota Timberwolves leaders in points scored:

1. Kevin Garnett – 19,041 points
2. Wally Szczerbiak – 6,777 points
3. Sam Mitchell – 4,127 points
4. Tom Gugliotta – 3,756 points
5. Anthony Peeler – 3,622 points
6. Terrell Brandon – 3,157 points
7. Stephon Marbury – 2,826 points
8. Troy Hudson – 2,576 points
9. Joe Smith – 2,533 points
10. Sam Cassell – 2,402 points

T-Hud, who once sold 78 copies of his debut album Undrafted in its first week, shouldn’t be in the top 10 of these statistical categories. He appeared in 257 games with the Wolves and started 113 of them. He was the stopgap between Brandon and Cassell due to injury. He was the successor to Cassell at an exorbitant salary (more on that later) after contract disputes between Minnesota and the Cassell-Sprewell tandem. He shot 40 percent from the field during his time with the Wolves. And yet, he finds his fingerprints all over these top 10 lists for that 12-year stretch.

It’s the perfect representation of the Wolves and their maneuvers during the Garnett era. Decent role players stuck around long enough to put up franchise numbers. Secondary stars cycled through like it was a revolving door into an office building. And roster move after roster move seemed to fail or not last nearly long enough for acceptable sustaining success.

Hindsight of their miscues

It’s easy to look back at any trade, signing, or draft pick a team screws up, point at them, and then laugh as if you knew better the entire time. But understanding how a franchise can bungle even one of the most foolproof superstars ever means going over this stuff with an extra critical eye. Bungling a Hall of Famer — maybe the only Hall of Famer you’ve ever had in 30-plus years of existence — is the basketball crime the Wolves franchise made during this time. It wasn’t just one bad decision that seemed to ruin the franchise. It was a cascade of miscues and poor calculations by Kevin McHale and his front office during 12 years of Garnett being an otherworldly basketball figure.

As I mentioned above, Garnett becoming so good so quickly hindered the Wolves. They had to offer him one of the biggest contracts in NBA history at the age of 21 because they couldn’t risk losing him. In doing so, Minnesota made their margin for error razor thin. Garnett’s salary ate up so much of the cap that any regular misstep along the way would set them back. But the Wolves didn’t make regular mistakes. They made catastrophic ones that turned Garnett’s first 12 years into veritable basketball limbo.

The Marbury-Gugliotta issues

KG and Marbury were supposed to be the future. Not just the future of the Wolves. Many believed they’d be the future of the NBA. A modern-day Stockton and Malone with a lot more entertainment value. In a basketball world that was further and further embracing individualism and personality, Marbury and Garnett were going to perfectly bring the Wolves into the forefront of the NBA — a place they had only been briefly during a couple Isaiah Rider dunk contests. But the lockout and collective bargaining agreement triggered by the owners hating the Garnett contract turned this situation sour.

Marbury wanted to be paid at least as much as Garnett. Instead, his deal would be roughly $55 million less over the span of that contract. Marbury wasn’t just being short-changed in comparison to Garnett’s deal (whether he deserved it or not). His contract was close to half of what Garnett’s deal was. That didn’t sit right with Marbury. If he wasn’t going to be able to make KG money, he would at least make sure he was the highest-paid player on his own team. Marbury would be moved to the New Jersey Nets in March 1999. That led to Flip Saunders unearthing what Marbury had said to him.

“The issue is K.G.,” said Saunders, who met with Marbury over the weekend. “(Marbury) said, ‘Right now, whether it’s right or wrong, I have a tough time playing with K.G. when he’s making the amount of money he’s making and I’ll be making only $71 million.’ “

At the time of the deal, Wolves owner Glen Taylor said the franchise was kind of forced into the nine-player, three-team deal that brought it Terrell Brandon. They also acquired Brian Evans and a future draft pick that would become Szczerbiak in 1999 from the Nets. Taylor claimed it was a matter of Marbury wanting to be back East, where he grew up. But that wasn’t what all of the other whispers around the NBA said when Marbury refused to sign a contract extension with Minnesota and threatened to leave for nothing as a free agent. McHale tackled the post-trade press conference by saying loyalty no longer exists.

“I guess loyalty and some other words are long forgotten these days,” McHale said. “It’s a very difficult time to be an executive in the NBA, I’ll tell you that.”

There were other deals on the table for Marbury that fell apart. McHale turned down Sprewell and Chris Childs from the New York Knicks in a trade. There was a complicated four-team trade that would have had PJ Brown and a pick going to the Vancouver Grizzlies, Tim Hardaway going to Milwaukee, Brandon and a pick going to Minnesota, and Marbury going to Miami. But the Heat decided to drop out of the deal. Then the Nets swooped in to bring Marbury back East.

As for Gugliotta, he left a couple months prior to the Marbury trade. After the lockout ended, Gugliotta fled Minnesota for the warm desert in Phoenix with a six-year, $58.5 million contract. He didn’t want to play with Marbury anymore, but the Wolves weren’t going to trade their star point guard to keep Gugliotta. They wanted to keep him, but not at the expense of Marbury. A couple months later, both players were gone and the Wolves were left to replace him on the cheap. That player? Former No. 1 pick Joe Smith.

The Joe Smith debacle

By now, you should know the tale of the Minnesota Timberwolves and Joe Smith. While he was a can’t-miss prospect out of Maryland in 1995, Smith struggled to find dominance with the Golden State Warriors and the Philadelphia 76ers. He lasted 2.5 seasons in Oakland, averaging 17.0 points and 8.2 rebounds. He wasn’t exactly a bust. But he also wasn’t the franchise-changing forward the Warriors thought they were drafting. He was good but not good enough. And when he declined an $80 million extension from the Warriors, they ended up moving him with Brian Shaw to Philadelphia in his third season for Jim Jackson and Clarence Weatherspoon. Nearly a year after the trade, Smith signed a one-year, $1.75 million contract to play next to Garnett.

After making over $8 million in his first three seasons combined, why did Smith take such a small amount to play in Minnesota? After all, nobody goes to sign in Minnesota. Well, turns out the Wolves had an under-the-table agreement with Smith and his agents to evade the salary cap structure that was strangled by the Garnett money they committed. Once Smith signed three one-year, cheap deals with the Wolves, they’d officially have his Bird rights. For those who don’t know, Bird rights allow a team to go over the salary cap to retain a player, but you must play at least three seasons for a team before they can possess full Bird rights on you. Yes, it’s named after Larry Bird.

After the third one-year deal, the Wolves would be allowed to pay Smith over $80 million on a long-term deal (if incentives were met). Including the three one-year deals, it would’ve pushed this agreement with Smith to 10 years and roughly $93 million. This kind of stuff gets agreed to with a wink of an eye and an understood nod of acceptance in the NBA often enough. Here’s what doesn’t happen in these instances, though: Usually nobody is dumb enough to actually put it into writing.

The Wolves were dumb enough to put this in writing.

It was discovered by the NBA when Smith’s agent, Andrew Miller, left the agency owned by Eric Fleisher. Miller kept both Smith and Garnett as his clients after separating from Fleisher. That’s when Fleisher sued Miller. In discovery for that case, the NBA became aware of the agreement signed by Taylor and Smith’s representation. McHale denied he was involved, but he was apparently in the room when the illegal agreement was signed.

This led to David Stern dropping the guillotine on the Wolves. He fined the organization $3.5 million. He suspended McHale and Taylor from the organization until the summer of 2001. Stern also took away five first-round picks from the Wolves. Their first-round picks for 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005 were a severe punishment that crippled the team’s ability to build with young talent on the cheap. He’d later return two of the picks. Publicly, Stern gave the Wolves a reprieve in 2003 when they returned the middle pick. As a reward for good behavior, Stern eventually gave them back the 2005 pick. However, the punishment had been levied and it hurt the Wolves greatly.

Although, it’s fair to wonder if they would have made the best of those missing draft picks anyway.

Draft miscues

Ah, the NBA Draft! Where dreams are made and nightmares are realized for some organizations. Talent evaluation is one of the toughest things to do. Executives and scouts are trying to estimate just how much growth and production and chemistry can occur with young men anywhere from 17 to 23 years old, still far from developing as professional basketball players. Some evaluators are obviously more skilled than others, but the Wolves have a pretty rough history of getting this part of team construction correct.

For years, they just missed on good options. In their first draft ever, they selected Pooh Richardson with the 10th pick of the 1989 draft. And Richardson was a solid enough pro. But of the seven players taken directly after Richardson, four of them were Nick Anderson, Mookie Blaylock, Hardaway and Shawn Kemp. In 1992, the Wolves had highest chance of winning the No. 1 pick. Instead, they ended up third in the draft. The first two picks that year? Shaquille O’Neal and Alonzo Mourning — both franchise-changing Hall of Famers. They ended up with Christian Laettner, who would make one All-Star Game for the Atlanta Hawks in 1997.

However, as unlucky as the Wolves had been, they got it as right as you can get it in 1995. With the fifth pick, they took the high school kid out of Chicago. Garnett was the experimental draft risk, and McHale nailed the selection with Saunders. They had no doubt they were taking him after the first workout they attended. And he ended up easily being the best player in franchise history. But in the next 11 drafts after that, disaster essentially struck. This is how their draft history from 1996 to 2006 looks with the guy they selected, the players taken after that selection, and even the players selected after where their penalized draft picks would have existed. All draft selections/trades are noted below.

Parents, I can’t stress enough how much you should not show this to your children.

• 1996 – The pick: Ray Allen (5)* | Players taken after: Kobe Bryant (13), Peja Stojakovic (14), Steve Nash (15), Jermaine O’Neal (17)
• 1997 – The pick: Paul Grant (20) | Players taken after: Bobby Jackson (23), Stephen Jackson (42)
• 1998 – The pick: Rasho Nesterovic (17) | Players taken after: Ricky Davis (21), Al Harrington (25), Rashard Lewis (32), Cuttino Mobley (41)
• 1999 – The pick: Wally Szczerbiak (6) | Players taken after: Richard Hamilton (7), Andre Miller (8), Shawn Marion (9), Jason Terry (10)
• 1999 – The pick: William Avery (14) | Players taken after: Ron Artest (16), Andrei Kirilenko (24), Manu Ginobili (57)
• 2000 – The pick: No first-round pick** | Players taken after: DeShawn Stevenson (23), Marko Jaric (30), Michael Redd (43)
• 2001 – The pick: Forfeited (18) | Players taken after: Zach Randolph (19), Brendan Haywood (20), Gerald Wallace (25), Jamaal Tinsley (27), Tony Parker (28), Gilbert Arenas (31), Mehmet Okur (38)
• 2002 – The pick: Forfeited (24) | Players taken after: Nenad Krstic (24), John Salmons (26), Carlos Boozer (35), Luis Scola (56)
• 2003 – The pick: Ndubi Ebi (26) | Players taken after: Kendrick Perkins (27), Leandro Barbosa (28), Josh Howard (29), Mo Williams (47), Kyle Korver (51)
• 2004 – The pick: Forfeited (29) | Players taken after: Anderson Varejao (30), Chris Duhon (38), Trevor Ariza (43)
• 2005 – The pick: Rashad McCants (14) | Players taken after: Danny Granger (17), David Lee (30), Monta Ellis (40), Lou Williams (45)
• 2006 – The pick: Brandon Roy (6)*** | Players taken after: Rudy Gay (8), JJ Redick (11), Rajon Rondo (21), Kyle Lowry (24), Paul Millsap (47)

* — Ray Allen was selected 5th and traded to Milwaukee with future first-round pick for the 4th pick (Stephon Marbury) in 1995
** — Traded in deal that acquired Dean Garrett and Bobby Jackson in 1999; pick ended up being Morris Peterson for Toronto
*** — Traded in deal on draft night that acquired Randy Foye and cash

Let’s roll through these briefly. Despite missing out on three Hall of Famers (Allen, Bryant, and Nash), the move for Marbury was more than justified at the time. It looks awful in retrospect, but even with hindsight I think you have to defend this move in 1996. It just didn’t work out when the money issues came up with the future contracts. And it’s important to note that it occurred in a much different pay structure system.

I defy you to find one Paul Grant jersey. He played 111 minutes total in the NBA and only eight of those happened with the Wolves. Sure, they’d eventually end up with Bobby Jackson anyway, but that’s still a waste of a pick. Rasho Nesterovic ended up being a very serviceable starting center for the Wolves. Maybe he wasn’t ideal and there were a few more dynamic players taken after him, but I’ll defend that selection. The tough part is when we get into the 1999 draft, when they possessed picks 6 and 14 in the first round.

At the time, Szczerbiak was a highly touted prospect. Szczerbiak was a scoring machine in college, and he was chiseled with a strong jawline. If he’s any kind of dynamic, you can market the hell out of that guy. He was legitimately good, but he wasn’t as good as the guys taken behind him. The next four picks after Wally were Richard Hamilton, Andre Miller, Shawn Marion and Jason Terry. Hindsight makes this look really bad, but, in the moment, the pick was justifiable. The problem is figuring out if their process was still correct though for how they believed the draft would shake out.

The Wolves badly needed a point guard. They had just acquired Brandon for Marbury a couple months prior, but Minnesota wasn’t going to have Brandon for the next six or seven years or anything like that. They needed someone to take over soon enough and run the show with KG. That 1999 draft was full of great point guard prospects. It touted Steve Francis, Baron Davis, Andre Miller and Terry (more of a combo/lead guard at the time). It also had William Avery out of Duke. Francis and Davis were off the board at No. 6, but the Wolves still could have gone with Miller as their guy. Instead, they seemed content with Avery falling to them at 14 to give them the point guard depth they needed.

Let’s say they go with that strategy of point guard first and best available player after that. Miller at 6 and Ron Artest at 14 looks demonstrably better than Szczerbiak and Avery. Miller could have been their stable point guard for a decade, and imagine a defensive system Saunders could create with Garnett and Artest. Granted, the locker room and team mentality could have been extremely volatile, but the alternative was a one-time All-Star in Szczerbiak and a point guard who the NBA gave up on after three seasons.

As for the rest of this run, they traded away their 2000 first-round pick for role players in Dean Garrett and Bobby Jackson. That move worked out and they didn’t miss out on much after where that pick would have been. They missed out on picking a really good player in 2001 with the forfeited pick. The fallout of a 2002 pick wasn’t terribly detrimental, but it still stung. In 2003 when they got their pick back, they wasted it on Ndubi Ebi and his 86 minutes in the NBA. They didn’t miss much in terms of available talent in 2004, but Anderson Varejao next to Garnett would have been a stellar pairing. With the pick mercifully given back in 2005, they swung and missed with Rashad McCants.

McCants once called the Wolves franchise a graveyard, which isn’t necessarily wrong. But he also sucked at the NBA level and wasn’t worthy of the lottery pick they used on him. They passed on some dynamic talent. A combination of Garnett and Danny Granger could have been really good. In 2006, they drafted Brandon Roy with the sixth pick, so that they could move him to Portland for the seventh selection, Randy Foye. What did moving down net the Wolves in order to get Portland their guy? Cash considerations. Not another player. Not a future pick. Just some cash.

KG as the talent evaluator

Garnett doesn’t get a complete pass for this. He had influences with the front office that didn’t totally work out for the Wolves. I don’t think any of those things are nearly as damning as what ownership and the front office did with the roster around him, but in the interest of being fair, it’s worth noting how he affected some moves for the team. First, let’s jump into the Sam Cassell-Latrell Sprewell fallout.

After the 2004 run to the Western Conference Finals, the Wolves had some decisions to make with their new Garnett running mates, Cassell and Sprewell. Both players helped transform the Wolves out of their perennial first-round exit existence into a team worthy of fearing. Or at the very least, worthy of respect.

Sprewell and Cassell wanted contract extensions, as would anybody in that situation. Cassell went into the training camp for the 2004-05 season looking to renegotiate his deal to remain with the Wolves long-term. But he had just sustained a back injury a few months earlier in the playoffs, and Cassell was about to turn 35 years old. McHale and Taylor declined the contract extension on Cassell’s terms and decided to just roll into the season with two seasons left on his deal. As for Sprewell, he declined a three-year, $21 million contract. His previous deal netted him an average of just over $12 million per season. Nearly cutting that in half on an annual average insulted Sprewell, and he infamously claimed he needed to feed his family. He’d play out the season, and then have his agent claim it was a slap in the face to be offered minimum deals in the summer of 2005. He’d never play in the NBA again, despite several teams showing interest.